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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

DEATH OF A DRAWER OF A CHECK
By L. W. FEEZER*
this country there are undoubtedly hundreds of thousands of
people living on salaries, who pay their monthly bills by means
of bank checks. These checks are regularly drawn on adequate
balances and are regularly paid as presented. Yet the obligation
of these bank depositors upon various accounts, current living
expense, expenses in connection with past illness and particularly
installment purchase of homes, furniture, clothing, automobiles
and the like, constitute such a total that were all claims against
them to be presented at. once, they could not pay. The salary
earner is a going concern. The good will of his job and his earning power is such that he has a certain credit. He is not in busi.
ness but he has need for a modest line of credit and he uses that
credit in running his household and raising his family. For some
transactions he uses that credit, others he settles in "cash." He
uses as cash, however, not ordinarily currency, but the "cash" of
the modern American business world, viz., a bank check.
Suppose such a man, owing an amount in excess of his savings,
buys a suit of clothes from a dealer who demands "cash." lie
gives a check on a bank account which is sufficient to meet that
check and other checks which he will be obliged to draw in order
to meet installments upon his various obligations as they come
due. He puts on the suit, steps into the street and is run over
by a fire engine' and killed.
The store-keeper looking out the door of his shop sees this
tragedy, grabs his hat and the check and rushes to the drawee bank
where he gets his money. The transaction is now closed. The
store-keeper has his money, the bank has paid the check and is
discharged of its debt to the depositor's estate, pro tanto.
But suppose the store-keeper, not knowing the ways of the law
and of bankers, takes the deceased customer's check to the bank
N

*Professor of Law, University of South Dakota, Vermillion, S. D.:
Visiting Professor of Law, Ohio State University, College of Law,

Columbus, Ohic.

'In short he is instantly killed under circumstances the least likely
to yield to his family a fund with which they could carry on his
obligations. A fire engine being operated by a municipal corporation as
a governmental function will create no liability in tort in most jurisdictions.
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the next noon and offers it for deposit to his credit along with the
rest of his day's takings. The banker will say to him, "We cannot pay this check of John Doe's because John Doe is dead." In
short, by the death of the drawer, the holder of the check, who
demanded a "cash" payment for his wares, who contemplated participation in a cash transaction, is by operation of law, said to be
converted into a creditor of the estate of the drawer. At best he is
put to a great deal of delay and inconvenience and usually to some
expense in collecting his claim from the personal representative of
the deceased. More likely, in a type of fact situation such as has
been supposed, he is one of the unsecured creditors of an insolvent
estate. The vendors of the late John Doe's automobile, radio,
furniture and the like will enter his apartment pursuant to their
conditional sales contracts and repossess the goods they sold him.
The undertaker and funeral expenses will be paid by the administrator and the holder of the check will lose.
It seems to the writer that this is not only an injustice but
is unnecessary. The modern business conception of the transaction in which one gives valuable consideration in exchange
for a check is, that he is participating in a cash and not a credit
transaction. Most executed sales involving more than a trifling
sum are today settled by passing a check. The payee has no
intention whatever of extending credit. He is making a cash
sale.
Why is it the general understanding of lawyers and bankers
that "the death of the drawer revokes a check?" Such is
unquestionably the generally accepted belief of both of these
classes and it is supported by a considerable number of judicial
2

decisions.
2See cases cited and discussed in articles by Zane and Balkan, see

note 3 infra. Also the rule is stated and authorities collected, Brannan.
Neg. Inst., 4th ed., p. 674. 7 C. J. p. 702-4. See also Charznowska v.
Corn Ex. Bk., (1916) 173 App. Div. 285, 159 N. Y. S. 385. Sneider v.
Bk. of Italy, (1920) 184 Cal. 595, 194 Pac. 1021. Johnson v. Thomas,
(1927) 93 Fla. 67, 111 So. 541.
See Note, p. 157.
1 Morse, Banks and Banking, 6th ed., sec. 400, p. 890, note 3. "At the
instant of his death the title to his balance vests in his legal representatives,
and his own order is no longer competent to withdraw any part of that
which is no longer his own property."
But the death of the owner of negotiable paper does not impair the
rights or powers of an agent to collect, viz., in Moore v. Hall, (1882)
48 Mich. 143, 11 N. W. 844, it was held that an agent to whom negotiable
paper is endorsed for collection may sue thereon in his own name and as
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This question has not been the subject of a great deal of
discussion in legal periodicals. The writer has discovered only
three articles dealing specifically with it3 and the latest and best
of these is now over twenty-five years old. Writing in the
Harvard Law Review in 1903 4 Mr. John M. Zane presents in
scholarly fashion the reasons which have been given for this
view and reviews the cases which had been decided upon this
point, or had enunciated it by way of dictum, up to the date of
his article.
It would seem to the writer that the orthodoxy of legal
reasoning which has been invoked in cases involving the problem of the effect of the death of the drawer of a check, and which
has apparently resulted in the very general acceptance of the rules
as they are asserted, may be reduced to a few familiar principles. The question which it is proposed to raise herein is
whether it is necessary to apply these "principles" to the type of
fact situation which has been supposed and, even if so, whether
the result is a desirable one in point of justice and commercial
convenience.
These principles would include1. A check is not an assignment pro-tanto of the funds of the
drawer in the drawee bank. Or, to put it in terms technically
more accurate, a check is not an assignment pro-tanto of the
depositor's chose in action as a creditor of the bank.
A few jurisdictions, prior to the adoption of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, held the opposite view 5 and some cases since
the act have limited the effect of its language and have treated
a check as an assignment for some purposes at least between
6
drawer and holder.
2. The drawee of an unaccepted bill of exchange including a
the endorsement for such purpose passes legal title in trust, the authority
to collect
is not revoked by the death of the owner.
3
Balkan, Payment of Bill of Exchange or Check By the Drawee After
the Drawer's Death, (1901) 14 Harv. L. Rev. 588; Zane, Death of tile
Drawer of a Check, (1903) 17 Harv. L. Rev. 104. Daniel, The Effect of
the Death of the Drawer of a Check, (1879) 3 Va. L. J. 323.
4(1903) 17 Harv. L. Rev. 104.
5
1n the extended note L. R. A. 1916C 169, the following states were
said to have this view-Ill., Ia., Ky., La., Minn., Neb., Okla., S. C., S. D.
See also 43 L. R. A. (N.S.) 100.
OThese are collected and discussed in Aigler, Rights of Holder of
Bill of Exchange Against the Drawee, (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 857.
For an excellent judicial discussion of this question see Leach v. Mechanic's
Savings Bank, (1926) 202 Iowa 899, 211 N. W. 506, 50 A. L. R. 389.
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check is under no obligation to the payee or holder to accept
7

or pay the instrument.

There are of course situations where a drawee who has
refused to pay and who has not formally accepted in writing
may nevertheless be held liable to the holder thereof. 8
3. If the relation of banker and depositor be regarded as one of
agency, the agency is revoked by the death of the depositor.0
In answer to this it has been argued that insofar as drawing and delivering a check created an agency, the situation is
in the nature of an agency in the holder and is one coupled
with an interest. 0
It has been said that a check is a mandate to the banker
or an athority or order, and that the correct theory is not in
truth one of agency."
12

Says Mr. Zane,'

"But upon analysis it amounts to an offer on the depositor's
part to the banker, that if the check is paid by the banker, the
amount of it may be subtracted from the depositor's account.
This offer to become effective as a contract must be accepted
by the banker during the depositor's lifetime."
4. A check is only.a conditional payment of a debt and, if the
check is not paid; the creditor to whom it is given may sue
on the debt; or the transferee who acquires it from the original
creditor of the maker, may sue on the contract of the check
itself, against this maker and may also charge his transferor
as indorser.
The law on this point, as on many others, is as it is usually
stated not because the logic of justice or commercial expediency
7

Section 127 Negotiable Instruments Law provides "A bill of itself

does not operate as an assignment of the funds in the hands of the drawee

available for payment thereof and the drawee is not liable on the bill
unless and until he accepts the same." And section 189 "A check of itself
does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit
of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder unless
and until
it accepts or certifies the check."
8
See Article by Aigler, Rights of Holder of Bill of Exchange Against
the Drawee, (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 857; also Feezer, Acceptance of
Bills of Exchange by Conduct, (1928) 12 MfiNNEsoTA LAw REviEw 129.
OSee articles by Balkan, Payment of Bill of Exchange or Check By
the Drawee after Drawer's Death (1901) 14 Harv. L. Rev. 588 and Zane,
Death of the Drawer of a check, (1903) 17 Harv. L. Rev. 104.
"'See article by Daniel, (1879) The Effect of the Death of the Drawer
of a Check, 3 Va. L. J. 323.
"Balkan, (1901) 14 Harv. 'L. R. 588; Daniel, Negotiable Instruments,
6th ed., sec. 1618 b.
12(1903) 17 Harv. L. R. 104-113.
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has dictated this rule, but because of the profession's conservative
adherence to the traditional principles of the law. The principles,
so called, are themselves but the product which has resulted from
the play of judicial rationalization upon the practical requirements
of a previous era in the law's development.
This development was much more greatly hampered by procedural formalism in the past than it is today, and the "principles" so called which have come to us out of that past are not so
completely the expression of the economic and social requirements
of the period which gave them birth, as might be the case in a
period of less formalism in legal procedure.
It has already been mentioned that the rule under consideration is largely due to the "principle" that a check was not an
assignment of the fund upon which it was drawn, wholly, or
pro-tanto, as the case might be.
Is not that rule in turn due, not alone to practical banking
considerations, but in part to the fact that the question arose at a
time when the assignability of choses in action at common law
had not been established and the contest was still on between the
courts of common law and of equity as to which would capture
the jurisdiction over the merchant's causes-a contest which was
settled, as we know, by the reception of the law merchant into the
common law?
The early cases which laid down this rule were, as pointed
out by Mr. Zane, all gift cases." 3
To return again to Mr. Zane, he concludes with this paragraph:
13The rule which is the subject of this discussion is usually traced back
to Tate v. Hilbert, (1793) 2 Ves. Jr. 111. Mr. Zane shows that the
original dictum is in Lawson v. Lawson, (1718) 1 P. Wms. 441, in which
it was held by Sir Joseph Jekyll as between the executor and the donee of a
check, that a bill upon a goldsmith given by a man upon his death bed
to his wife for mourning w9uld operate as an appointment. During the
course of the argument, Jekyll remarked that the testator's order on the
goldsmith was but an authority and that it was determined by testator's
death. Then in Tate v. Hilbert where the holder of a check brought a
-bill in equity against the drawer's executor the court approved of Jekyll's
statements as to the determination of the authority and refused to hold
the check to be an appointment.
Continuing Mr. Zane says: p. 109, "In the foregoing cases recovery
was sought against the estate of the drawer. The check in each instance
was a gift. The reason given for the decision is that the check as an
authority to the banker is withdrawn or destroyed by the drawer's death
before acceptance of the check." 17 Harv. L. Rev. 104, 109.
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"There is nothing inequitable in the rule that the death of the
drawer revokes an unaccepted check. The check is payment only
if it be paid. If the dishonored check is in the hands of the payee
who received the check upon a consideration, the payee can
recover his claim from the estate if it is solvent. If the check was
given without consideration, the law can give the payee no relief.
If the check is in the hands of a bona fide transferee, he has
recourse upon his indorser. as well as upon the drawer's estate if
the check is dishonored. But there is no reason why, in case the
drawer died insolvent, a creditor should obtain a preference merely
because he happens to have a check and the insolvent debtor left a
balance at his bankers. All the creditors should be placed upon
an equality, for equality is equity."
As to the donee, probably everyone would be content to agree
with Mr. Zane. It is with the first sentence and the last two that
this article is in disagreement.
It does, however, seem to the writer that it is distinctly inequitable, that the death of the drawer revokes a check, even though it
be unaccepted, as against a payee who has given value for it. It is
submitted that there is evidence that the courts have frequently
been responsive to this sense of inequity and have in spite of the
widespread rule that a check is not an assignment, and even in
spite of the statute-permitted recovery in such cases-rationalizing their decisions by such devices as we have seen, chiefly
unauthorized qualifications of the language of sections 127 and
189 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. These courts have
decided that under the particular circumstances the judgment
should be for the check holder. Other factors than the logical
interpretation and application of the rules of the law merchant
and statutes declaratory of it, have played a part in determining
such decisions. This rationalization in relation to assignment for
the purpose of imposing liability upon drawees who have not
accepted has not been confined to cases where the drawer has
died, as indicated by Mr. Aigler,' 4 and as I have tried to show in
a previous article in this REVIEW.' 5
Lastly, Mr. Zane defends the general rule as to death revoking a check, because he does not want a creditor to secure a preference.
Strictly a check-holder is undoubtedly a creditor since a check
14 Aigler, Rights of Holder of Bill of Exchange Against the Drawee,
(1925) 38 Harv. L Rev. 857.
'sFeezer, Acceptance of Bills of Exchange by Conduct, (1928) 12
MINNESOTA
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is only a conditional payment, but as already contended for in the
first part of this paper, the writer feels that in a practical sense
and in harmony with commercial practice and understanding, one
who has taken a check in "satisfaction" of a debt or upon an
executed sale, is not in truth a creditor and, even if he is, he might
well be entitled to a preference over other creditors who have
elected to trust their vendees, whereas he has collected his claim
in the "cash" of modern business, the "cash" in which the overwhelming majority of commercial settlements are made where
the amount is more than trifling.
Even though the estate of the drawer is solvent, I am still
not content that the tradesman who dealt with him, as he thought,
for cash, should be compelled to submit to the delay, expense and
inconvenience of being a claimant in the administration of a decedent's estate.
It is so well settled that a gift of the drawer's own check is
revocable and gives the donee no rights, either against the drawee
or drawer, that these gift cases may be disposed of on that basis."0
In an article by George H. Balkam published in the Harvard
Law Review in 1901,17 the view that the death of the drawer
does not revoke a check is defended. Mr. Balkam's theory seems
to be in brief that the order contained in a check is good until
countermanded. That death itself is not a countermand, as a
countermand of the original order cannot arrive without an act
of will on the part of the drawer. Hence, concludes Mr. Balkam,
the order not being countermanded by the death, notice of the
event to the drawee cannot do so, or as he says, "Notice of an
ineffective event cannot make it effective."
Mr. Balkam does not wish to rely on the view that a check
is an assignment and agrees with the great weight of authority
8
which is the other way.'
Mr. Balkam also declines to be content with the arguments that
a check constitutes an agency coupled with an interest and is
hence not revoked by death of the principal.
Everyone, considering the fundamental rule that death of the
16In re Knapp's, Estate, (1924) 197
8 MIN-EsoTA LAw REvrEw 546; Burrows
485, 134 N. E. 271, 20 A. L. R. 174, and
authorities cited by Zane, (1903) 17 Harv.
17(1901) 14 Harv. L. Rev. 588.
18(1901) 14 Harv. L. Rev. 588, 591-2.

Ia. 166, N. W. 22. See note
v. Burrows, (1922) 240 Mass.
extended note p. 177; Early
L. Rev. 110 footnotes.
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drawer revokes a check, is of course struck by the inconsistency

of the proposition that a payment by the drawee before notice of
the death is good as against the drawer's estate. Yet this is
The only reason Mr. Balregarded as thoroughly well settled."
kam can find for this "exception" is "because the order to pay
is not countermanded by the drawer's death." To say this is,
of course, begging the question and indeed Mr. Balkam's article
fails to convince even a willing reader that he has made his point.
In the last analysis the only basis upon which Mr. Balkam rests
his whole argument is that a check is not an agency or authority,
but an "order" and hence not cancelled by the drawer's death.
But after all that does not help us as long as the courts continue
to hold that the bank may not safely pay this "order" with notice
of the drawer's death. It seems to the writer that the courts
hold the bank blameless when they pay without notice of the
drawer's death, not because such is the conclusion to be drawn
from any syllogistic legal reasoning, but, because to hold otherwise would create a situation that commercially would be intolerable.
If a bank dared not pay a check unless in communication with
the drawer, lest he have died, commercial banking would involve
risks that would be commercially suicidal.
The New York case of Glennan v,.Rochester Trust Co.,"0
simply says,
"It is true that the common law rule that death revokes an agent's
power, even as to third persons dealing with the agent in good
faith, without notice, is the rule in this state. The question is
whether payment of checks by banks is an exception to the rule
stated. I think it is."
Judge Cullen, dwelling on the difference between the relation of
principal and agent and that between bank and depositors, says:
"In the ordinary conduct of a bank but a minute fraction of its
payments is made directly to its depositors. The others are made
on checks in favor of third parties, usually, at least in large cities,
presented through other banks or the clearing house. The numisGIennan v. Rochester Trust Co., (1913) 209 N. Y. 12, 102 N. E. 557.
52 L. R. A. (N.S.) 302. Accord, as to bankruptcy, where bank pays
check without notice thereof; Citizen's Union Bank v. Johnson, (1923)
286 Fed. 527, 31 A. L. R. 255. Where the check was drawn on a partnership account and one of the partners died before it was presented, the bank
having paid without notice was protected. Elgin, Adm. v.Gross-Kelley Co.,
(1915) 20 N. Mex. 450, 150 Pac. 922, L. R. A. 1916C 711.
20(1913) 209 N. Y. 12, 102 N. E. 557, 52 L. R. A. (N.S.) 302.
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ber of depositors is often very great, many of them living at other
places than where the bank is located. Of the death of those
prominent either by their public position, their business activities
or great wealth, the bank might be apprised; of the great mass
their deaths would pass unknown by the bank unless notice of the
fact were given. It wcndd be utterly impractical for business to
checks, it must delay
be done if, before the bank could safely pay 21
to find out whether the drawer it still living.
As to the theory that the check is an authority or power
coupled with an interest, which was the theory of another law
review article by Mr. Daniel, 22 Mr. Zane says, 2 3 "This theory was

suggested by Mr. Vernon 24 in the argument in Lawson v. Lawson
almost two hundred years ago. It was dismissed in that case by
Sir Joseph Jekyll as unworthy of discussion.
It seems unnecessary to the writer to find an analogy in order
to hold that the bank may, if it desires, pay the check, and also
that the holder can successfully demand a preference to the
extent of his check out of the bank's debt to the deceased drawer
as against not only the administrator but as against claimants
who had voluntarily entered upon the status of creditors of
the drawer.
Let us return to the thought that this doctrine was established
in gift cases, by decision and by dictum, and was applied in gift
cases for over a century and a half before it came up in a case
involving a check in the hands of a bona fide holder in which that
fact was squarely the issue.2"
21
The remainder of this opinion is interesting as a revelation of judicial
process. First, he says the rule that one dealing with an ordinary agent
whose authority has been terminated by the death of principal is unfortunate
but too firmly established by judicial decision to be overthrown. Secondly,
the "exception" governing the present case is supported by but little
authority but is generally accepted. Third, the law can be just as well
established by its general acceptance as by judicial decisions. Fourth, a rule
so proper as that "exception" under consideration here is so good and so
well established that it should not be sacrificed to judicial consistency.
How naively the courts do reveal (when that is what we are looking
for) what they perhaps do not at the time realize themselves, viz, that
there are factors besides precedent and the pure logic of judicial consistency
which enter into the process of deciding cases, and when these other factors
are powerful enough they will prevail. We all realize that if the law
were to be logically consistent throughout it would be so unreasonable and
so unjust in some respects that it could not be enforced for a moment.
22(1879) 3 Va. L. J. 323. Mr. Daniel has taken the same view in his
text, 2 Daniels, Negotiable Instruments, 6th ed. sec. 1618 b.

23(1903) 17 Harv. L. Rev. 104, 113.

24(1818) 1 P. Win's 441.
25
The earlier authorities on this type of situation are reviewed by Mr.
Zane, (1903) 17 Harv. L. Rev. 104, 117.
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When it did come up, the authorities were divided as to
whether a check was an assignment,2 6 and the question whether a
check was revoked by the death of the drawer in turn depended
upon that question.
The effect of the Negotiable Instruments Law,2T upon the
status of a check as an assignment, has naturally been to reduce
even further the minority view holding it to be such. This whole
question is extensively discussed in Mr. Aigler's article.28
The first case which involved a check unpresented until after
the death of a drawer where the check was in the hands of a
bona fide holder (not a donee) was Wiegand Adm. v. State Bank
29
of Maysville.
In this case the check was drawn in payment of an antecedent
debt owed by the drawer to the payee. Upon the death of the
drawer, plaintiff, as administrator, notified defendant of his appointment and countermanded checks previously issued by
decedent. Defendant at first refused to pay and protested the
check in question, which exceeded the amount of the deposit. Later
it refused to honor the check drawn by plaintiff as administrator,
claiming that the funds in its hands were appropriated to the
check drawn by decedent.
Holding that a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint should be
overruled, the court said, "a bank may not pay the checks drawn
by its depositors after notice of death."
As commented upon by Mr. Zane it is a coincidence that
26
Aigler, (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 857; 43 L. R. A. (N.S.) 100;
L. R. 7A. 1916C 169; 5 A. L. R. 1667.
- Sec. 189, see Note 7 p. 127.
28(1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 857. He shows how some courts in an
effort to adhere to their former position have limited the effect of this,
section 189. See also Brannan, Neg. Inst. 4th ed., p. 674, 902, 911, 916.
29(1901) 112 Ky. 310, 65 S.W. 617, 66 S. W. 26, 56 L. R. A. 178,

dissent by three judges. That that case was the first case where the check
was issued for value is asserted on the authority of Mr. Zane at page 112
in his article. Mr. Zane admits that there is much dictum the other way
where the check was given for a debt or obligation owing by the drawer
to the payee. He cites the following cases in which dicta indicated that
lack of valuable consideration for issuance of the check was a factor
regarded by the court as of some consequence.
Second Nat'l Bank v. Williams, (1865) 13 Mich. 282; Fordred v. Seaman's
Savings Bank, (1871) 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. 425; Simmons v. Cincinnati
Savings Bank, (1877) 31 Ohio St. 457.
Zane criticizes this distinction on the ground that it imposes on the
bank the duty of determining whether a check was given for value before
cashing it. It seems to the present writer that this is sufficiently answered
by the rule that a negotiable instrument is presumed to have been given
for value.
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Kentucky in which this case was decided was one of the small
minority of states which prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law
held that a check was an assignment. 30
During the past twenty-five years since Mr. Zane's article,
nothing has been discovered by the writer hereof, in any law
review, upon this question of the effect of the drawer's death
as revoking a check. Apparently the legal profession in all its
branches has for the most part taken this rule for granted. It is
impossible to say why. Perhaps it is regarded as satisfactory;
perhaps it has been considered unimportant; or perhaps dissatisfaction has existed but has not been expressed. The writer has
made a point during the last two years of asking many law
teachers and practicing lawyers this question, "Do you think the
rule of law that the death of the drawer revokes a check, is a
desirable and necessary rule?" Almost all have said that it was
unnecessary from a practical standpoint. The majority have
thought that it was a necessary consequence of section 189 of the
Negotiable Instruments LawY
I think all have agreed that the
rule permitting a bank to pay a deceased depositor's check so
long as it is without notice of the death, is an arbitrary and
illogical exception, but that it is commercially necessary.
As to the actual state of the law on this point1. Where the check is a gift of the drawer and the question
arises as to the rights of the donee as against the bank or the
personal representative of the drawer, it is probably agreed every3 2
where that the donee-payee takes nothing.
2. Where the check has passed to a holder for value or the
original payee gave value.
a. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law-those states
which have taken, at their face value, as they are ordinarily
interpreted, sections 189 and 127, will hold that the holder
takes at most a claim against the estate of the drawer and
30
1t was expressly held in Boswell v. Citizen's State Bank, (1906) 123
Ky. 485 that the Negotiable Instruments Law changed the previous rule
in Kentucky.
31
32See Note 7 p. 127.
For early authorities see cases cited in articles, Zane, (1903) 17
Harv. L. Rev. 104; Balkan, (1901) 14 Harv. L. Rev. 588; Daniel, (1879)
23 Va. L. J. 323.
More recent cases are: In re Knapp's Estate, (1924) 197 Ia. 166, 197
N. W. 22 and note (1924) 8 MINNESOTA LAW REviEw 546. Note that
Iowa was a state which formerly treated a check as an assignment.
Pullen v. Placer County Bk., (1902) 138 Cal. 169, 71 Pac. 83, 94 Am. St.
Rep. 19. See note 43 L. R. A. (N.S.) 109.
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that the bank has not even the right or option to pay the
33
check after notice of the drawer's death.
b. In the absence of the Negotiable Instruments Law or an
equivalent rigid interpretation of the law merchant and in
those states which have been balky about giving section 189
of the Negotiable Instruments Lav the effect which most of
its sponsors have asked for it, it is reasonable to expect again
some leniency in permitting banks to pay the checks of deceased persons. But few cases have referred to this question.
Litigation has doubtless been checked, indeed extermintated
by the general acceptance by both the legal profession and the
banking world, of the view that the drawer's death cancels
the check if the bank has notice of the fact and that settles
the matter.
One case has been discovered in California"4 which clearly
presents the question of payment to a holder for value of a check
whose drawer was dead, and which held that the holder could
recover from the bank which had refused payment. This was an
action in which the bank and the administrator were joined as
defendants. Both defendants demurred and this was sustained
in the trial court. But this was overruled in the appellate court
as to both defendants.
The effect of the decision is Dot only that the bank may pay
the holder for value but that as between the administrator of
the drawer and the check holder the bank must pay the check
holder where he is a holder for value.
This case considerably antedates the adoption of the Negotiable
Instruments Law in California but it comes from a state which in
Pidlen v. Placer Co. Bank 35 had been emphatic in holding that a
check is not an assignment and that the bank must actually refund
to the estate of a deceased drawer, any amount paid to a donee
after knowledge of the death.
The Pullen Case just referred to was expressly distinguished
on the ground that the holder of the check there had given no
33

Cases prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law holding that where a

check founded upon valid consideration is an assignment pro tanto and
that death of the drawer before presentation for payment does not revoke
the check
are collected in note 43 L R. A. (N.S.) 109, 110.
34
Nassano v. Tuolumne County Bank, (1912) 20 Cal. App. 603, 130
Pac. 29; Contra Cook v. Lewis, (1912) 172 Ill. App. 518.
35(1902) 138 Cal. 169, 71 Pac. 83, 94 Am. St. Rep. 19; Donohoe Kelly
Banking Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., (1902) 138 Cal. 183, 71 Pac. 93.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

consideration. The court then proceeded to reiterate Daniel's
argument that the situation was analogous to an agency coupled
with an interest.

36

The only other departures from the majority rule, not found
in states which have in part or in whole adhered to the assignment theory, in spite of the Negotiable Instruments Law, so far as
the writer has been able to discover are statutory provisions in
37
Massachusetts and New Jersey.
The Massachusetts provision reads:
"The death of the drawer does not operate as a revocation of
the authority to pay a check if the check is presented for payment
within 10 days from the date thereof."
38
The New Jersey provision is similar.
In the British Bills of Exchange Act on the other hand the
question is settled the other way by the provision:
"The duty and authority of a banker to pay a check drawn on
him by his customer are determined by (1)3 9 a countermand of
payment, (2) notice of the customer's death.
Chaffee, after referring to the above mentioned statutes, says:
"Since the Negotiable Instruments Law contains no provision
upor this point it must as an omitted case, be governed by the
rules of the law merchant under Section 196."4o
One other recent case deserves particular notice in relation to
the present inquiry.

This is also a California case. 41

Inl this

case one Kenton gave to Miss Dunn, his niece, a check for services
31 Daniel, Neg. Inst. 5th ed., sec 46. See, vol. 2, 6th ed., sec. 16i18
b., p. 1818 by Calvert. This edition, though published since the adoption
by many of the states of the Negotiable Instruments Law adheres to the
former view, but unfortunately does not refer to that act and cites in
support many cases which must be regarded as no longer of authority on
account of the repudiation by the courts which decided them of the
assignment theory. In the note there is an extended quotation from an
article by Mr. Daniel in 3 Va. L. J. 323 in which he set forth this view
more at length, but relying on the repudiated assignment doctrine and
analogies from the law of agency.
This same view is taken in 1 Morse, Banks and Banking, 6th ed.,
p. 891.
37Mass. G. L. 1923, ch. 107, sec. 17; N. J. Laws, 1916 ch. 123.
35
While this statutory provision protects a bank by permitting it to
pay a check drawn against sufficient funds etc. within 10 days after customer's death, it does not affect the rights of the holder against the drawer's
estate, Burrows v. Burrows, (1922) 240 Mass. 485, 134, N. E. 271, 20
A. L. R. 174, and the estate may recover back from the holder what lie
collected from the bank after the drawer's death.
39Section 75 B. E. A.
40
Brannan, Negotiable Instruments, 4th ed., p. 675.
41Dunlap v. Commercial National Bank of Los Angeles, (1921) 50
Cal. App. 476, 195 Pac. 688.
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rendered in taking care of him while he was ill. The check was
for the full amount in the bank. He died. The bank refuses to
pay her. She sues the bank and Kenton's administrator interpleads
as a party plaintiff claiming the fund. The bank becomes a mere
stake-holder, and in the contest as between the payee and the
administrator the trial court's judgment for the check-holder was
affirmed by the court of appeals.
The court says the Negotiable Instruments Law alone does not
prevent the equitable assignment of specific property as evidenced
by a check, if it appears from the entire transaction that it was
the intention of the parties to pass the title to the bank's debt to
the drawer.
The point is also made in the opinion that if the payee became
the owner of this debt of the bank then it never was a part of the
drawer's estate and hence the administrator has no claim to it.
Likewise the payee has no claim against the estate and even if
the administrator has apparent title to the drawer's chose in action
as against the bank it is only as trustee for the payee or holder.
The court does not indicate whether the result would be the
same if the check had only been for a part of the balance in the
bank and does not cite Nassano v. Tuolumne County Bank42 in
which such was the case. In that case the "check" was for $500
and the decedent drawer's balance was $1,100.
The whole language of the opinion in the Dunn Case reveals
an inclination to hedge at giving the Negotiable Instruments Law
the full effect so often argued for. This inclination is, of
course, found in many cases particularly in jurisdictions which
prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law held the view that a
4
check, although unaccepted, might be an assignment. 1
The case does not, even if it be correctly decided, as it evidently
was on its own facts, afford any relief as to the general plight
of those bona fide holders for value of checks whose drawers
42(1912) 20 Cal. App. 603, 130 Pac. 29.
43
Numerous references have already been made to notes and texts in
which this question has been referred to. See particularly, however, Aigler.
Rights of the Holder of a Bill of Exchange Against the Drawee, (1925) 38
Harv. L. R. 857.
Iowa, one of the states slow to yield its pre-statutory point of view and
on that account the object of much "professorial criticism," has apparently
yielded in Leach v. Mechanics Savings Bk., (1926) 202 Iowa 899, 211
N. W. 506, 50 A. L. R. 389, in which the whole history of Iowa's extensive
judicial consideration of this subject, together with the criticism it has
suffered is reviewed. The change of front was not made, however, without
a vigorous protest from two dissenting members of the court.
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are so inconsiderate as to die before the checks are cashed. All
that this case says is that when from the entire transaction it
appears that there was an intention to transfer title to the bank
deposit, the holder can collect from the bank as against the administrator. This is not enough to justify a bank in paying the
check to the holder. The only way in which the bank can be
secure in doing so is by litigating the question to judgment, viz.,
a judgment which determines that from the whole transaction
the parties did intend to transfer title to the deposit.
There is, it seems to me, one suggestion in Mr. Aigler's article,
already referred to, 44 which does open a possibility for an interpretation of section 189 which will permit a check to be treated
as an assignment in favor of a holder where the drawer is
dead. Mr. Aigler points out :
"It must be noticed that these sections (127 and 189) simply
provide that a bill or check of itself shall not amount to an assignment. If the bill or check plus something else might have
amounted to an assignment or created a situation giving the holder
without acceptance or certification a remedy against the drawee,
such a result may just as well follow under the statute as before
its enactment."
Conceivably the courts might find that the check plus death of
the drawer without countermanding or stopping payment, constitutes the "something else" mentioned by Mr. Aigler, at least where
the holder is a holder in good faith and for value.
There is also to be considered that an ordinary bill of exchange
other than a check may be paid by the drawee after the death of the
drawer even though it was not accepted before the death occurred.
Mr. Balkam comments upon this point in his article, citing
as his authority Billings v. De'Voux,4 an English case of 1841, and
Cutts v. Perkits,4 7 an early Massachusetts case. Daniel sees no
reason for distinction, saying of it:
"without pausing to define a check here, suffice to say that
it certainly is a species of bill of exchange. This being true, what
is there about it which makes the death of the drawer have a different effect from that resulting from the death of the drawer
of any other bill of exchange? Nothing that we can discover. ' 48
44See
note 43 supra.
45
Aigler, Rights of Holder of Bill of Exchange Against the Drawee
(1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 857, 870.

46(1841) 3 Man. & Gr. 565.

47(1812) 12 Mass. 206.
48(1879) 3 Va. L. J. 323. Citing as his authority Chitty, Bills, 13th
Am. ed., 325, 1 Parsons, Notes and Bills 287, who speaking of the different
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But Mr. Zane evidently does see a difference. He says:
"But even though there be no authority for saying that the bill
of exchange as a mandate to the drawee is not revoked by the
death of the drawer, and even if we assume that such mandate
is not revoked by the death of the drawer before acceptance, there
are reasons why a bill of exchange should receive different treatment from that accorded to a check. A bill of exchange is
expected to be put into circulation, a check is not."
This is of course not true in business practice today. Probably
a larger portion of the checks written in America today pass
through the hands of holders beyond the payee than is the case
with private bills of exchange. Again says Mr. Zane:
"Bills of exchange are usually drawn at a distance from the
home of the drawee and the application of the rule (viz., that
the drawee may not pay after notice of drawer's death) as to
bills of exchange would cause practical difficulties which would
not be met in the case of checks."
The first part of this objection does not seem to the writer to be
a correct expression of the situation in the business world today
and as for the latter part of it, Mr. Zane does not tell us what
are these practical objections.
It should also be noticed that the English statute adopting
the general rule is by its language limited to checks 0 and as for
section 189, providing that a check is not an assignment, which
is relied on by cases since the Negotiable Instruments Law in
denying the. bank with notice of a depositor's death the right to
pay his checks, the language of section 127 as to other bills of
exchange is of precisely the same effect.
By way of conclusion, the writer would emphasize that the
matter is after all a practical one and whatever may be the temporary effect of judicial decisions as to the technical impossibility
of a check being regarded as an assignment, the question will in
the end be settled in a manner consonant with the established
practices of society and business. It may require legislation to do
this, such as has been adopted in Massachusetts and it may
become so apparent a necessity that a court having decided the
question in favor of the check holder will find a way to rationalize
the result to its own satisfaction.
.rules as to checks and other bills of exchange, says, "They are irreconcilable." Morse, Banks and Banking, 6th ed., p. 891, makes the same point,
citing49 the same references.
Bills of Exchange Act, Sect. 75.
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For a precedent as to what may be expected to happen if
general commercial understanding does ultimately concede that
the death of the drawer should not affect the value, security and
convenience of a check which has been negotiated for value, we
have only to go back to the days of Lord Holt and his futile efforts
in Clerk v. Martin and a few other cases50 to stem the tide of
business necessity, which were happily soon checked by the enactment of the statute of Anne51 and to notice that recently in New
52
York State the legislature made securities receipts negotiable
following the decision holding them non-negotiable in Manhattan
Co. v. Morgan.3
50
Clerk v. Martin, (1702) 2 Lord Ray. 751, 1 Salk 129; The other cases
were: Patter v. Pearson, (1702) 1 Lord Ray. 759; Burton v. Sauter,
(1703) 2 Lord Ray. 774; Williams v. Cutting, (1703) 2 Lord Ray. 829,.
Farr, 154; Bailer v. Crips, (1703) 6 Mod. 29.
51(1704) 3 and 4 Anne c. 9. sec. 1.
52
After the decision in Manhattan Co. v. Morgan here referred to, the
legislature by an act made effective April 30, 1926, conferred negotiability on
"Security Receipts" (defined as including receipts for bonds, notes, debentures, shares of stock, voting trust certificates, etc.) and equipment
trust certificates, Laws 1926, ch. 704. See (1926) 26 Col. L. Rev. 884.
53(1926) 242 N. Y. 38, 150 N. E. 594. And for a case in which the
same result was reached by decision in -which the Ohio court of appeals
really seems to adopt the theory that the N. I. L. was not intended to apply
to "off type instruments." See Hopple v. Cleveland Discount Co., (1927)
25 Ohio App. 138, 157 N. E. 414. And see note, (1927) 26 Mich.
L. Rev. 224.

